

## Part I

### The Philosophy of Sophie de Grouchy

## 1. On Sympathy

As outlined in the previous introduction, Sophie de Grouchy's eight *Letters on Sympathy* of 1798 emerged out of a long and complex tradition of sensationalist psychology and epistemology that stretched back to the seventeenth century and John Locke. At the same time, her *Letters* are framed by and represent her specific responses to the positions staked out by Adam Smith in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. This rich background shaped de Grouchy views very different from Smith's, and the differences begin with their account of the origin of sympathy.

### Smith and De Grouchy on the Origin of Sympathy

Both Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy provide a moral theory based on sympathy. Their views on sympathy, however, vary significantly. The differences between them begin with their initial assumptions concerning the foundation of sympathy, and their further differences follow. For de Grouchy Smith did not sufficiently tend to the topic of the foundation of morality, and she opens the *Letters* by criticizing Smith for failing to provide an account of the origin of sympathy. Due to this omission, she claims Smith was not able to show that sympathy necessarily exists and is always present. Her argument at the outset is not merely a criticism of this omission but a claim concerning the consequences of Smith's theory that follow. She writes:

You know that the subject of the opening chapters of Smith's book is sympathy.

Smith limited himself to noting its existence and to showing its principal effects. I regretted that he did not dare go further, to penetrate its first cause, and ultimately to show how sympathy must belong to every sensible being capable of reflection.

You will see how I had the temerity to fill in these omissions. (*Letters*, 357)

The idea that sympathy is deeply embedded in our nature is developed throughout the *Letters* and renders de Grouchy's ethical, social and political views different from Smith's. A full comparison between Smith and de Grouchy will show that the differences between their moral and political views are rooted in their conceptions of the origin of sympathy. The quote above should be read in contrast to Smith's opening statement in TMS. There, Smith simply assumes the existence of sympathy:

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are *evidently* some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it...That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instance to prove it.<sup>1</sup>

For Smith, then, sympathy exists self-evidently. On the other hand, de Grouchy devotes the first two *Letters* to explaining the causes and origin of sympathy. She provides an empirical explanation for the origin of sympathy, showing how sympathy originates in experience, first in sensations of pleasure and pain. Grounding morality in experience was an important task in the context of the Enlightenment in order to grant the environment a significant role in shaping

individual morality. This task begins with Locke. In his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke attempts to explain the origin of moral ideas in experience, an issue which he does not complete. In Book Two of the *Essay* Locke writes:

Amongst the simple *Ideas*, which we receive both from *Sensation* and *Reflection*, *Pain* and *Pleasure* are two very considerable ones... Things then are Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or Pain. That we call *Good*, which is *apt to cause or increase Pleasure*, or *diminish Pain in us*.<sup>2</sup>

Locke then establishes a correlation between sensations of pleasure and pain and moral ideas. But, how is this connection made in experience? In what way does it translate into a moral theory? The quotation above represents the extent of Locke's attempt to include ethics in his work, and the *Essay* remains mainly an epistemological work. Condorcet goes further than Locke and opens the *Sketch* with the following statement:

Man is born with the ability to receive sensations; to perceive them and to distinguish between the various simple sensations of which they are composed... Sensations are attended by pleasure or pain; and man for his part has the capacity to transform such momentary impressions into permanent feelings of an agreeable or disagreeable character, and then to experience these feelings when he either observes or recollects the pleasures and pains of other sentient beings.<sup>3</sup>

Condorcet goes on to explain that morality develops based on this capacity to feel for others. He

does not develop this argument further, and it is possible that at this point he was already influenced by de Grouchy. Hume and Smith are empiricists as well, yet they do not incorporate an empirical analysis of the origin of morality. Hume offers more than Smith, but he does not provide a complete explanation. With a detailed account of the empirical origin of moral ideas de Grouchy provides an original contribution to this discussion.

### De Grouchy's Empiricism

Like Locke, de Grouchy claims that morality originates in sensations of pleasure and pain. Further than Locke, she fully develops the link between sensations and human morality. What becomes a unique feature of her theory is her analysis of pain and suffering and the ways in which they motivate sympathy. It is by virtue of being able to feel pain and then detect it in others that we come to care about them. Pleasure plays a lesser role. She begins with an analysis of physical pain as follows:

Every physical pain produces a compound sensation in the person who experiences it. It first produces a local pain in that part upon which the cause of pain acts initially. Beyond that, it produces a painful general impression in all our organs, an impression very distinct from the local pain and that always accompanies the latter, but that can continue to exist without it. (*Letters*, 357)

De Grouchy explains, that “a general impression of pain” can be renewed upon recalling a pain we have suffered; hence results the experience of a painful memory. Further, de Grouchy argues that seeing another person suffer will provoke a painful sensation as well. This observation, in

effect, is the heart of de Grouchy's concept of sympathy: sympathy consists in feeling pain upon seeing another person suffer:

In the same way as the memory of an injury we have felt reproduces the painful impression that affected all our organs and that formed part of the local pain this injury caused us, so, too, we feel this painful impression again when, being in a position to notice the signs pain, we see an impressionable being suffer or whom we know suffers. (*Letters*, 359)

In other words, for de Grouchy morality begins with sensitivity to suffering and consists in identifying or being able to feel with another. In fact she defines sympathy as “the disposition we have to feel as others do.”

Her terminology in the first *Letter* and her discussion of pain and bodily organs can be better understood in the context of her exchanges with Cabanis. Her nineteenth-century biographer, Antoine Guillois, suggests that the *Letters* reflect conversations de Grouchy had with Cabanis over the subject of physical pain.<sup>4</sup> Cabanis in *On The Relation Between The Physical and Moral Aspects of Man* (1802) sets out to map the relation between physiology and the formation of character and ideas or “...the systematic development of his organs with the analogous development of his sentiments and passions.”<sup>5</sup> He explains morality as a biological phenomenon, and he also provides a physiological explanation for the origin of sympathy.

At the heart of Cabanis' theory (and also of de Grouchy's) stands the concept of sensibility. Sensibility according to Cabanis is our ability to feel sensations. Sensibility is what enables us to receive impressions from both internal and external sources and these constitute the

content of the soul or mind. Without sensibility we would neither survive nor have a single idea.

Without the sensibility we would not become aware of the presence of external objects; we would not even have a means of perceiving our own existence, or rather we would not exist. But from the moment at which we feel, we are.<sup>6</sup>

In an attempt to explain feelings, Cabanis claims that the main organ of sensations is the brain, but it is the nervous system that transmits sensations throughout the body. The nerves feel and the brain perceives sensations. Sensations, then, make us feel. Cabanis points out that sensitive organs, via the nervous system, can produce feelings in other organs, a phenomenon which he labels as “sympathetic communication of the affections from one organ to another.”<sup>7</sup>

It must appear natural that the excess of action in an important organ brings on a proportional excess of influence, on its part, over the other organs that are sympathetically linked to it.<sup>8</sup>

In his view, through sympathetic communication between and among organs, the entire body participates in feeling pain. It is in this sense – an appeal to physiological phenomena followed by an emotional reaction – that we are to understand de Grouchy's claim that a general impression of pain in all our organs follows a local pain.

Cabanis' explanation of sympathy is very similar to de Grouchy's. He also appeals to sensations of pleasure and pain in his account of sympathy. As pleasure and pain are important for the preservation of the animal, we cannot conceive of our nature without them. Pleasure and

pain are also essential for sensibility. When we detect these feelings in others, we sympathize.

The signs thus recall the sensations; they make us FEEL again...Other [sensations] manifest themselves externally; to help him communicate with others. Among the latter....those of pleasure and pain, which are remarked in the features, the attitude, the cries of different animate beings, make us feel with them, SYMPATHIZE with their joys and sufferings.<sup>9</sup>

The similarity between de Grouchy and Cabanis sheds light on her use of sensationalism but does not continue much further. Cabanis remains a materialist and explains that just as parts of matter tend toward one another, so do living beings. Sympathy then “falls within the domain of the instinct.”<sup>10</sup> Cabanis also places sympathy at the core and base of morality. He writes that sympathy is one of the greatest assets of sociability, but otherwise Cabanis does not develop this issue. We can see de Grouchy’s influence on the analysis of sympathy in Cabanis’ work. When Cabanis writes about moral sympathy, for example, he refers the reader to their works, and especially to de Grouchy’s:

These [sympathetic] tendencies are in fact, then, what is understood by the expression MORAL SYMPATHY - a principle celebrated in the writings of the Scots philosophers - whose great power in eliciting the sentiments was recognized by Hutcheson; of which Smith carried out an analysis that was full of wisdom, though incomplete for this lack of success in relating it to physical laws; and which Madame Condorcet by simple yet rational considerations has been able in

great part to draw out of the vagueness in which the THEORIE DES SENTIMENTS MORAUX (THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS) had left it.<sup>11</sup>

### The Role of Pain in De Grouchy and Smith

De Grouchy claims that pain is a phenomenon that has “moral presence.” As noted, by virtue of the fact that we are able to perceive and react to pain in others, “Pain and adversity are such effective schools for making men more compassionate and more human.” (*Letters*, 362) De Grouchy places our sensitivity to pain at the heart of her moral theory. Ultimately our willingness to help others and our aversion from harming others will depend on our feelings for those who suffer.

De Grouchy notes that repeated experiences of feeling pain produce “an abstract idea of pain.” She uses an empirical analysis to suggest that we construct general ideas from particular instances through the process of abstraction. Again we observe that de Grouchy is using Lockean terminology and frames of reference, for as Locke puts it:

...the Mind makes the particular *Ideas*, received from particular Objects, to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the Mind such Appearances, separate from all other Existences, and the circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, or any other concomitant *Ideas*. This is Called ABSTRACTION, whereby *Ideas* taken from particular Beings, become general Representatives of all of the same kind....<sup>12</sup>

Thus, from particular instances of pain we form an abstract idea of pain. For de Grouchy the point is that an abstract idea of pain, such as pain we have not experienced ourselves, pain of people we do not know, or suffering of a whole group of people will evoke our sympathy as well. Upon learning of any of the above, we, too, feel pain. De Grouchy keeps reminding us that what is triggered by the idea of suffering is a “general impression of pain on all our organs.” Thus, she is in a good position to explain what is meant when one claims that the sight or idea of atrocities is “sickening.” It is the abstract idea of pain that has a moral presence:

In effect, as soon as the development of our faculties and the repeated experience of pain permit us to have an abstract idea of it, that idea alone renews in us the general impression made by pain on all our organs. Here, then, is an effect of pain that follows equally from both its physical presence and its moral presence. One understands here by its moral presence either the idea that our memories give us of pain or that which we can have of it by the sight or knowledge of another’s pain. (*Letters*, 359-60)

Smith, in contrast, makes no use of the concept of physical pain. He writes:

Nothing is so soon forgot as pain. The moment it is gone the whole agony of it is over, and the thought of it can no longer give us any sort of disturbance. We ourselves cannot then enter into the anxiety and anguish which we had before conceived.<sup>13</sup>

We see then that for Smith physical pain serves no function. Smith devotes a section in TMS entitled “Of the Passions which takes their origin from the body” to explain that bodily sufferings excite no sympathy at all or very little sympathy compared to what is felt by the sufferer. For Smith, a physical sensation does not arise in the spectator as a response. We do not become hungry, he notes, by reading about famine. Suffering in general for Smith stems from the imagination. A disappointed love calls for much more sympathy than the greatest bodily evil. Smith emphasizes that we sympathize through our imagination, not through our bodies:

The frame of my body can be but little affected by the alterations which are brought about upon that of my companion:... The person who has lost his whole fortune, if he is in health, feels nothing in his body...our imagination can more readily mould themselves upon his imagination, than our bodies can mould themselves upon his body<sup>14</sup>

For Smith then, physical pain and emotional pain are two separate, unrelated phenomena. In his theory Smith manifests the traditional mind body-dualism whereas de Grouchy does not. Both Smith and de Grouchy write a moral theory based on sentiments, but in the *Letters* the idea that morality is always felt and not merely thought is developed much further.

### The Role of Sympathy in De Grouchy and Smith

From her sensationalism and the preceding account of physical pain emerges the aspect of human relations in the *Letters*. This is an additional dimension in de Grouchy’s philosophy, not present in any of her contemporaries, including Cabanis, and does not appear until twentieth-

century feminist ethics. As we have seen, the sensationalists argued that morality originates in sensations of pleasure and pain. De Grouchy pays novel attention to the context in which sensations of pleasure and pain arise, pointing out that sympathy emerges when these sensations are first felt at the hands of caretakers. That is to say, our moral disposition develops out of a relation to another human being. In addition, for de Grouchy dependency on others is a significant aspect of human relations that has moral repercussions. Each person depends on many others from the fulfillment of basic needs to welfare in general. Dependency she notes “begins in the crib” and broadens throughout one’s life as the circle of people we are dependent upon expands. De Grouchy argues that we cannot be indifferent to those who contribute to our happiness and welfare. We develop a capacity to care for them, and we are led in turn to care for their well-being and happiness. The claim that morality is embedded in dependency on others is a fundamental point in her philosophy because eventually we depend on many other individuals. From this perspective, people’s willingness to help those in need stems from an understanding of the extent of their extensive dependency on others or, in fact, on the rest of humanity. We will see later how this point that shaped de Grouchy’s social and political views. De Grouchy here integrates ideas from two traditions, French sensationalism and British sentimentalism, to argue that morality originates in both physical sensations and sympathy, but claims that the most significant aspects of our moral disposition are dependency on others and our relations to them.

For Smith the perception of pain is not the basis for our capacity to sympathize and neither are human relations. For Smith imagination is the basis for sympathy, and he does so because he claims that we do not directly perceive what another person feels. Imagination, he explains, functions to overcome what we do not naturally feel:

As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations....By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when they are brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels.<sup>15</sup>

In order to be able to imagine what another person feels we need to change places with the sufferer and only then we can begin to sympathize. Thus, seeing a person on ‘the rack’ is not disturbing to Smith until we can imagine what it would be like to be tortured. For de Grouchy our reaction is direct and immediate: “The first manifestations of particular sympathy arise at the very instant objects capable of stimulating it present themselves to us.” (*Letters*, 386) The difference between our two authors lies in their perception of the difficulty involved in coming to sympathize with another and the function of sympathy altogether.

In TMS Smith provides a theory of moral judgment based on sympathy. The first step for Smith is judgment of whether sympathy is appropriate at all. After providing a strong expression

of what a sympathetic reaction can be, Smith continues to qualify his view and claims that without knowing what caused the person's grief, sympathy is "extremely imperfect." Sympathy is imperfect because you do not really know what happened. Naturally you would ask, "What has befallen you?"<sup>16</sup> What we ought to imagine is how we would feel under the same circumstances. In effect the question is: is this person justified in feeling grief? Smith gives an example of witnessing a person in anger, perhaps a violent expression of anger. We first need to determine whether we would be angry under the same circumstances. Should we determine that we would not feel the same in that case, we would not sympathize. That is, sympathy depends on our own speculated reaction to the same causes. Indeed, Smith claims:

Nature, it seems, teaches us to be more averse to enter into this passion, and, till informed of its cause, to be disposed rather to take part against it...Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it.<sup>17</sup>

Smith carries the full implications of his views in TMS. He concludes that we might sympathize with someone even if they do not think they are suffering. For instance, a person might be poor but happy. Nevertheless, when imagining ourselves in their situation, we feel compassion. We might judge that a person is not angry enough given his circumstances.

We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the

reality.<sup>18</sup>

Smith goes so far to insist that a perception of feeling is not necessary to elicit sympathy, and thus he claims that we can even sympathize with the dead! We can sympathize with one who feels nothing, solely based on imagination of what it would be like to be in their situation:

We sympathize even with the dead...It is miserable, we think, to be deprived of the light of sun; to be shut from life and conversation; to be laied in cold grave, a prey to corruption and the reptiles of the earth; to be no more thought of in this world, but to be obliterated, in a little time, from the affections, and almost from memory, of their dearest friends and relations.<sup>19</sup>

Sympathy for Smith clearly correlates to a person's situation rather than to his or her emotions. It is also a conditional sentiment. In Smith's conception of sympathy, we actually bypass the expression of pain to examine the causes and determine whether the person's reaction is appropriate and whether sympathy is warranted.

Smith's insistence on learning of someone's circumstances before sympathizing makes sense in the context of his system. T.D. Campbell argues that because Smith's TMS is a theory of moral judgment based on sympathy, sympathy has to be conditional.<sup>20</sup> Sympathetic feelings are the standards by which we judge one another; thus our feelings and theirs cannot coincide. Smith writes that in order to sympathize with another we need to check that their passions "are suitable to their objects." He then continues to offer a detailed and complex theory of moral judgment where we judge propriety or impropriety of an action according to the sympathy (or

lack of it) we feel with a person's intentions, and we judge merit or demerit of an action by the sympathy or lack of it we feel about the consequences of the action.<sup>21</sup>

By contrast, for de Grouchy the role of sympathy is one of moral motivation. The sympathy we feel motivates us not only to help another person, but also to refrain from inflicting pain on another.

But when we have freed them from some harm or evil, our pleasure, like theirs, arises from the cessation of pain, and it is even more natural that the satisfaction of having made pain stop...Because the sight or idea of another's misfortune makes us experience a painful reaction, the feeling is more intense when we are the voluntary or even involuntary cause of this misfortune. (*Letters*, 435-6)

We can see here the implications of the concept of sensitivity to pain in the *Letters*. If indeed through sympathy we too feel pain with another human being who suffers, then sympathy entails that we would not be able to bear the sight of suffering. The goal is: "Render them [children] easily remorseful and sensitive to the voice of honor and integrity so that they are unable to see suffering without being compelled to relieve it." (*Letters*, 366) Moreover, not only would we be driven to help, we would also have a more compelling reason to refrain from inflicting pain. A painful sensation or the fear of it are the "motive behind prudence." (*Letters*, 347) In other words, de Grouchy views sympathy as a powerful force that can both motivate to help and serve as a deterrent from harm. The merit of this view is the idea that sympathy is a strong enough force that it can curtail cruelty. For her being able to experience sympathy rules out indifference to pain.

Smith would not necessarily object to the idea that sympathy would compel us to help. The problem with his view is twofold: one, even though sympathy is a natural disposition, it is not so easy to achieve; and two, in the end sympathy is not a strong enough sentiment itself to motivate us to action. Smith presents the following limitation for sympathy. He claims that for sympathy to work a “correspondence” of sentiments needs to take place. For example, he reminds us how good it feels when people are in agreement, share the same views, and laugh at the same jokes. If one laughs too hard, Smith thinks, it would be hard to relate to others. Since for Smith we access sympathy only through imagination, and given the difficulty in relating to another, what we feel is much weaker.

After all this, however, the emotions of the spectator will still be very apt to fall short of the violence of what is felt by the sufferer. Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, never conceive, for what has befallen another, that degree of passion which naturally animates the person principally concerned. That imaginary change of situation, upon which their sympathy is founded, is but momentary... The person principally concerned is sensible of this, and at the same time passionately desires a more complete sympathy...But he can only hope to obtain this by lowering his passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of going along with him. He must flatten, if I may be allowed to say so, the sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the emotions of those who are about him.<sup>22</sup>

We must tone down our reaction so the other person can relate to us; this effort both parties

undertake. Smith is uncomfortable with a strong expression of emotions. He conveys a lack of capability to sympathize with strong expressions of pain. In effect, it is indecent in his opinion to grieve or lament violently. The same goes with sympathy for happiness, Smith writes that “It gives us the spleen...to see another too happy or too much elevated”<sup>23</sup> This is a significant point in Smith’s theory since out of this effort to produce a harmony of sentiments the impartial spectator is born. We come to consider the way a spectator would feel in our situation. We realize then that “If the passion is too high, or if it is too low, he [the spectator] cannot enter into it.”<sup>24</sup> Propriety, Smith argues, consists in moderating the emotions. If we need to control the expression of our emotions so another person can sympathize with us, then the result is that what they feel only correlates to the display of emotions and not to what we really feel. Hence, for Smith sympathy is much weaker than the real experience of the other.

De Grouchy does not encounter the same difficulty in relating to another. Sympathy is a direct reaction: “Lastly, since we sympathize with the passions of others, the signs of those passions move us and suffice to make us feel them.” (*Letters*, 426) Sympathy is also unconditional because it is a direct response to suffering as opposed to Smith’s conception of sympathy as indirect (via the imagination) and conditional. In de Grouchy’s philosophy one again sees the background of sensationalism and her ideas of the origin of sympathy. Our first ties to others are ties of sympathy. Also, when feeling for another a physical reaction is present. De Grouchy starts with the assumption that before everything else we are similar and connected. What we feel is just as strong as the original sensation in the other. Smith, instead, assumes we are alone first, and therefore he requires imagination to bridge the gap. In the end, for Smith, we feel little and our emotions are “languid” compared to what the sufferer feels. If one agrees that the stronger the feeling is the more one would be compelled to help, then in de Grouchy’s

conception of sympathy we would reach much further with moral goals, and this point is completed in her *Letters* on progress which we will see in chapter three.

De Grouchy recognizes limits to sympathy, too. She could not live through a bloody revolution, witness a horrifying massacre, and be personally threatened and think that sympathy is so prevalent and achieved with ease. For de Grouchy sympathy is to be cultivated. She recognizes that people can become hardened. One of the recurring themes in the *Letters* is that sympathy needs to be exercised in order to exist at all and develop. She provides an analogy between physical exercise and exercising our sensibility to indicate that the vivacity of our moral disposition depends on tending to it.<sup>25</sup> From the point of view of the *Letters*, whether people end up with a disposition of the kind Smith describes or the kind de Grouchy espouses depends on one's goals of moral development and the effort and engagement in the process. Her conception of sympathy is of a disposition that can develop, that becomes habitual, and that eventually can constitute an integral part of one's interactions with other human beings. Smith treats sympathy as a steady disposition. It entails choice, but not improvement. We judge according to what we feel or do not feel as a result of imagination and thought. In de Grouchy's view of sympathy, beyond what we feel instinctively, there is room to ask what we ought to feel. For her, education and cultivating sensitivity in others is one of the goals of morality.

Finally in this connection, de Grouchy claims that sympathy is augmented by enthusiasm, which she also labels a moral phenomenon. Enthusiasm, defined as "a sentiment of the soul," is a capacity to imagine all the pleasures and all the pains that may arise from a certain situation. Through enthusiasm one can imagine an event in an exaggerated manner, thus multiplying the effects of what one sees or conceives. One can immediately imagine what it would be like to experience events that in reality can take a lifetime to occur. Her explanation and terminology is

not entirely clear in the *Letters* alone. It is easier to understand what enthusiasm signifies by looking at Voltaire's definition of enthusiasm in his *Philosophical Dictionary*. Voltaire sees enthusiasm as an emotional state, an ability to react emotionally to an event.

It is the rarest of things to unite reason with enthusiasm. Reason consists of always seeing things as they are. The drunkard is deprived of this reason when he sees things double. Enthusiasm is precisely like wine: it can excite so much tumult in the blood vessels, and such violent vibrations in the nerves, that the reason is entirely destroyed...This is what happens in great outbursts of eloquence, and above all in sublime poetry.<sup>26</sup>

In other words, enthusiasm explains the non-rational workings of the passions. De Grouchy applies enthusiasm to explain the workings of sympathy. She explains that enthusiasm predisposes us towards unreflective sympathy, and thus it increases the effects of sympathy. What we multiply here would be the images or thoughts of people's suffering. In all these aspects of the *Letters* then, sympathy and the extent and depth of a sympathetic disposition, are matters of choice and training.

The differences between Smith and de Grouchy's conceptions of sympathy affected their social and political views, as we will see. But first, we need to examine de Grouchy's criticism of Smith's views on reason.

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<sup>1</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 9. KB italics.

<sup>2</sup> Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, pp. xx, 220.

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- <sup>3</sup> Condorcet, *Sketch*, p. 3.
- <sup>4</sup> Guillois, *La Marquise de Condorcet*, pp. 121-22.
- <sup>5</sup> Cabanis, *On the Relations Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man*, p. 33.
- <sup>6</sup> Cabanis, *On the Relations Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man*, p. 51.
- <sup>7</sup> Cabanis, *On the Relations Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man*, p. 135.
- <sup>8</sup> Cabanis, *On the Relations Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man*, p. 664.
- <sup>9</sup> Cabanis, *On the Relations Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man*, p. 68.
- <sup>10</sup> Cabanis, *On the Relations Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man*, p. 585.
- <sup>11</sup> Cabanis, *On the Relations Between the Physical and Moral Aspects of Man*, p. 598.
- <sup>12</sup> Locke, *Essay*, p. 159.
- <sup>13</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 29.
- <sup>14</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 29.
- <sup>15</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 9.
- <sup>16</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 11.
- <sup>17</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 11-12.
- <sup>18</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 12.
- <sup>19</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 12.
- <sup>20</sup> T.D Campbell, *Adam Smith Science of Morals*.
- <sup>21</sup> Leonidas Montes in a recent article, "Das Adam Smith Problem: Its Origins, The stages of the Current Debates, and One Implication for Our Understanding of Sympathy"(2003), argues that viewing of Smith's concept of sympathy as moral judgment is a too narrow interpretation and that that sympathy for Smith also serves as motive for action. We will see in chapter three following that for Smith feeling sympathy would motivate us to help. Nevertheless, Smith's claim that first we judge whether sympathy is appropriate at all still holds.
- <sup>22</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 21-22.
- <sup>23</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 16.
- <sup>24</sup> Smith, *TMS*, p. 27.
- <sup>25</sup> For a good summary of cultivating sympathy through education see Evelyn Forget (2001).
- <sup>26</sup> Voltaire, *Philosophical Dictionary*, p. 188.